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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001 at 8:46:40 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11
crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York
City.1 Sixteen minutes and thirty-one seconds later, United Airlines Flight
175 struck the South Tower, killing all on board and an unknown number
of people in the tower.2 Approximately fifty-one minutes six seconds after
the second plane hit, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon
travelling at 530 miles per hour.3 All on board, including many military
personnel in the Pentagon, were killed.4 In a fourth plane, United Flight
93, passengers were aware their plane had just been hijacked and took a
vote to retake the plane to save their lives.5 Calls with family members
ended as the cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of passengers
trying to break through the cockpit door.6 Family members reported they
1. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, XV (2004) (summarizing investigatory findings
from the 9/11 attacks, including over 1,200 interviews and 2.5 million pages of
documents).
2. See id. at 8 (evincing flight contained 56 passengers according to the flight
manifest).
3. See id. at 9-10 (noting that Barbara Olson, wife of then Solicitor General Ted
Olson, was aboard Flight 77 and reported to her husband via phone that the plane had
been hijacked sometime between 9:16 A.M. and 9:26 A.M.).
4. See id. at 9 (stating that the Secret Service was notified at 9:34 A.M. that an
unknown aircraft was heading towards the Pentagon).
5. See id. at 13 (citing five calls to family members on the ground of passengers’
intent to revolt against the hijackers).
6. See id. at 14 (2004) (emphasizing the sound of breaking glass, loud thumps,
crashes, and shouts).
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could hear the voices of their loved ones on Flight 93 fighting among the
din.7 Shortly after 10:02:23 A.M., a hijacker can be heard saying, “Pull it
down! Pull it down.”8 The sound of passengers fighting to regain the plane
is audible until the aircraft plows into an empty field at 580 miles per hour.9
Hours after the collapse of the Twin Towers, the idea that the September
11th (“9/11”) attacks had “changed everything” permeated American
popular and political discussion.10 According to President George W.
Bush, the attacks on September 11th were the beginning of a “new kind of
war” and justified the hegemony of the United States as a global police
power.11
The Bush administration also argued that because the
circumstances were new, the policies that addressed terrorist attacks like
9/11 should be new as well.12 Like many tragedies, the events of 9/11
became a rhetorical bookend, marking the end of business as usual and the
beginning of a profound shift in U.S. national security public policy and
foreign relations.13
Courts began to question whether a new kind of war also justified a new
legal regime.14 Families of the 9/11 victims turned to the judiciary for
judgment and restitution from those they held responsible.15 Although AlQaeda and Osama Bin Laden took credit for the attacks, suspicion also fell
on Saudi Arabia when it was discovered that fifteen of the nineteen
hijackers were Saudi citizens.16 Families of 9/11 victims alleged that the
7. See id. at 13-14 (reporting that the hijackers responded to this attack by rolling
the plane and knocking the passengers off balance).
8. See id. at 14 (reporting that the hijackers were recorded yelling, “praise for
Allah”).
9. See id. (noting that the passengers’ attempts to retake the plane prevented the
hijacker’s from reaching the White House, their original target).
10. See MARILYN B. YOUNG ET AL., SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED
MOMENT? 2 (Mary L. Dudziak, ed., 2003) (arguing that 9/11 became a pretext for
justifying absolute sovereignty for the United States and limiting sovereignty for
others).
11. See id. at 3 (positing that some saw Bush’s characterization of war as
justifying a softening of constitutional restraints).
12. See id. (noting similar arguments followed World War I and World War II
arguing for softening of constitutional restraints regarding tactics to fight communism).
13. See id. at 3-4 (suggesting that while the theory that 9/11 changed the world
may be debatable, the attack did enable policies that otherwise would have appeared
overly aggressive).
14. See id. at 7 (arguing that after 9/11 courts were faced with how the law should
respond to times of crises).
15. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 665 (2d Cir. 2013)
(comprising one of the three cases that became known the Terrorist Attacks Litigation).
16. See Julian Hattem, Congress Publishes Redacted 28 Pages From 9/11 Report,
THE HILL (July 15, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://bit.ly/29ClRYj (reporting the Saudi
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Saudi royal family, banks, and charitable organizations provided financial
support to the Al-Qaeda hijackers through donations to extremist mosques
that promoted jihad.17 Many of these theories arose from a 2002 report by
the House and Senate intelligence committees that suggested Saudi
involvement, which became known as the “28 pages.”18 However, an
independent Congressional commission found no evidence that Saudi
government or Saudi officials funded the attacks.19
In July of 2016, the “28 pages” were released, reigniting public interest
in establishing a connection between Saudi Arabia and the events of 9/11.20
Against this backdrop, Senator Chuck Schumer of New York and Senator
John Cornyn of Texas proposed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism
Act (JASTA).21 JASTA was framed as a vehicle to hold accountable the
state sponsors of terrorism who had previously escaped liability through
“errors” in the U.S. legal system.22 By “errors,” drafters meant the
immunities afforded to Saudi Arabia under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Antiterrorism Act’s (ATA) condition that
litigants prove Saudi Arabia was the primary cause of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks.23 Although JASTA was framed narrowly as a means for 9/11
victims to hold Saudi Arabia liable under new rules, it amends
longstanding principles of sovereign immunity and relations between
citizenship of fifteen of the hijackers fueled suspicions that inflamed U.S.- Saudi
relations).
17. See Rowan Scarborough, Saudi Government Funded Extremism in U.S.
Mosques and Charities: Report, WASH. TIMES (July 19, 2016), http://bit.ly/29TPDcf
(emphasizing that follow-up investigations were unable to confirm the Saudi kingdom
or its agents helped or knowingly financed the attack).
18. See 28 Pages of the 2002 Congressional Inquiry Into the Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y.
TIMES (July 15, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2goFQjZ (discussing possible Saudi involvement
in the attacks).
19. See Editorial, The Risks of Suing the Saudis for 9/11, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28,
2016), http://nyti.ms/2eP9TAL (questioning the value of suing the Saudis without
causal evidence linking them to 9/11).
20. See Hattem, supra note 16 (characterizing the 28 pages as a political foil
containing only coincidental connections between the Saudis and the 9/11 hijackers).
21. See H.R. 3143, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing the early framework of JASTA
that would become Public Law No: 114-222).
22. See Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, “Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act” – Legislation, Long Sought By 9/11 Families, Will Allow Victims of
9/11 & Other Terrorist Attacks to Foreign Countries & Others that Funded Al-Qaeda,
Isis (Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Press Release] (arguing the Act will correct
“egregious errors” within the courts by circumnavigating the immunities afforded to
Saudi Arabia under the FSIA).
th
23. See id. (stating JASTA allows victims “like the September 11 victims” to
pursue foreign states that funded the attacks).
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states.24 Additionally, it allows private litigants to sue foreign states for a
terrorism claim, leapfrogging the executive’s foreign policy prerogative
and congressional evaluations of which states should be listed as state
sponsors of terror.25
This comment argues that JASTA’s intended purpose to provide
“justice” to victims of terrorism, though publically popular, fails to protect
U.S. citizens in the broader context of national interests.26 Further, JASTA
violates principles of sovereign immunity, and interferes with the
executive’s ability to shape foreign policy as the states’ external
representative.27
Part II will highlight the importance of sovereign immunity, its history,
and how the FSIA, ATA, and JASTA interact with the doctrine.28 Part III
will argue that JASTA cannot legally accomplish what it intends to do.29 It
will also show that the executive’s claim settlement power is not precluded
by JASTA in practice or in fact, but it places the executive at odds with
Congress, and undermines the executive’s ability to effectively manage
foreign policy.30 Part IV will advocate that Congress repeal JASTA and
consider a soft-power diplomatic approach that promotes collaboration
with other states to combat terrorism.31 Finally, Part V will conclude that
24. See Chet Nagle, Opinion, JASTA: The Anti-Saudi Law Will Hurt Us, Not
Them, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 26, 2016), http://bit.ly/2gypEJz (reporting the Dutch
Parliament’s characterization of JASTA as a “gross and unwarranted breach of Dutch
sovereignty” and Sheikh Jamal Al-Shari’s promise to sue the U.S. government in Iraq
should JASTA become law).
25. See Veto Message from the President – S.2040, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 23,
2016), http://bit.ly/2cZh99D [hereinafter Veto Message] (noting JASTA takes foreign
policy matters from professionals and gives them to private litigants and courts).
26. See Amir Taheri, JASTA: Misconceived and Stillborn, Can it Survive?,
ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (Oct. 5, 2016), http://bit.ly/2g4S14Q (describing JASTA as
“politically cost-free for Congress to send a signal” about being tough on terrorism).
27. See U.S. Const. art. II; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (concluding the President of the United States had “plenary”
powers in the foreign affairs field that are not dependent upon congressional
delegation).
28. See infra Part II (examining the principle of sovereign immunity and how the
FSIA, ATA, and JASTA have curtailed its protections in the United States).
29. See infra Part III (arguing that JASTA, as drafted, is legally ineffective).
30. See Dames and Moore v. Regan 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (upholding the
executive’s intervention into federal court litigation against Iran through President
Carter’s executive claims settlement power to negotiate the return of American
hostages); see also Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 866-67 (2009) (upholding
President Bush’s veto of a legislative act barring immunity for Iraq on the basis that it
would destabilize Iraq and principles of sovereign immunity).
31. See infra Part IV (advocating that JASTA be repealed because it violates
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JASTA is political legislation that unjustifiably puts the United States at
risk.32
II. BACKGROUND
A. Tracing the History of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Historically, the United States afforded foreign states and governments
complete or “absolute” immunity from suit in domestic courts.33 This was
considered the basic law of nations, and was grounded in recognition of the
“perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns.”34 In the early
part of the 20th Century, the Supreme Court made clear that if the
Executive Branch expressed its views regarding whether immunity should
be granted, courts were bound to accept those views.35 Courts thus looked
to the political branches for guidance in determining whether to exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.36
As states began engaging in commercial activities around the turn of the
century, the idea of blanket immunity began to erode in customary
international law.37 In response, the U.S. shifted to a “restrictive” approach
to sovereign immunity around 1952.38
The restrictive approach
distinguishes between public acts (jus imperii) of a foreign state, for which
immunity is generally accorded, and private acts (jure gestionis) for which

international law and reduces the likelihood of collaboratively fighting terrorism).
32. See infra Part V (concluding that JASTA is legally feeble because it does not
fully address the legal barriers of the FSIA or the ATA and sets dangerous foreign
policy precedent).
33. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (holding that
sovereigns possess equal rights and equal independence, and thus jurisdictions should
be mutually relaxed
over one sovereign in another territory).
34. See id. at 137 (suggesting that to haul a foreign sovereign into court would be a
serious affront to its sovereignty).
35. See Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1943) (stating that if the executive
announced a policy of immunity then this policy was binding on the courts); see also
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (holding that it is not for the courts to deny
an immunity which the government sees fit to allow).
36. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35 (reiterating issues of foreign policy, such as
immunity, generally fall within the executive rather than the legislature or judiciary).
37. See BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 538-40 (6th
ed. 2011) (citing to the Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate’s so-called “Tate Letter”
contending that international trade and greater contact between states justified this
distinction).
38. See id. (arguing customary international law had shifted to distinguish between
sovereign acts and commercial acts).
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immunity is generally not available.39 The “restrictive theory” narrowed
the applicability of sovereign immunity, and initiated a judicial process to
determine whether a claim against a foreign state involved a public or
private act.40 In practice, however, courts continued to reject jurisdiction
that could potentially disrupt foreign relations.41 This proved problematic
when immunity was not consistently or predictably applied.42 The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act was drafted to codify the sole means for a U.S.
court to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state.43
1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)
Under the FSIA, foreign states are immune from jurisdiction of all U.S.
courts unless one of the FSIA exceptions to general immunity applies.44
Courts first consider whether the defendant is a “foreign state,” as that
concept is defined under the FSIA.45 If the action does fall into an
enumerated exception and the defendant is determined to be a state, federal
courts have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.46 In 2008,
Congress expanded the FSIA’s exceptions through the “terrorism
exception.”47 The terrorism exception applies only when the foreign state
is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of (or as a result of)
the act in question.48 The provision also requires that the claimant or
victim be a U.S. citizen or an official or employee of the U.S. military at

39. See id. at 539 (advising that a trend toward a restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity is supported by the majority of states).
40. See id. at 540 (noting that this determination will either trigger or bar the
defense of sovereign immunity).
41. See e.g., Loomis v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 941, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (refusing to
permit the attachment of a fund which contained proceeds from the sale of oil owned
by Italy, despite having no formal suggestion of immunity from the State Department).
42. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6605, 6610 (indicating that the FSIA was meant to be the exclusive standard for
resolving questions of sovereign immunity).
43. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976) (making courts responsible for deciding
issues of immunity).
44. See id. (reflecting the purpose of the Act to generally afford immunity unless
specific exceptions can be established).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976) (defining “foreign state” to include not only the
state itself, but also a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the state).
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976) (noting that this process would either trigger or
bar the defense of sovereign immunity).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008) (covering both acts of terrorism by a foreign
state and providing material support for terrorism).
48. See id. (applying to Iran, Syria, and Sudan as of 2016).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

7

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
HOLCOMBE 3/9/2017(DO NOT DELETE)

366

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

5/23/2017 7:33 PM

[Vol. 25:3

the time of the claim.49 If these elements are met, a court can exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign state.50
In addition to providing a framework for what kind of suits can be
brought against foreign states, the FSIA also provides broad immunities
over the attachment of a foreign state’s assets.51 If a judgment is entered
against a foreign state, courts must independently consider the extent to
which a foreign state’s property may be subject to attachment or
execution.52 This secondary analysis of immunity for the attachment of
assets hints at the legislatures’ awareness at the time of the FSIA’s
codification that seizing a foreign state’s assets could seriously disrupt
comity between states and should only occur under narrow circumstances.53
Recent case law reflects a similar hesitation by courts to exercise
jurisdiction, particularly where the Executive Branch has advised that
doing so would harm U.S. interests.54 In 2004 the Supreme Court indicated
that the State Department’s views concerning the exercise of jurisdiction
over particular defendants might be entitled to deference.55 The Court
similarly ruled in a series of cases pertaining to sovereign immunity,
suggesting that deference to the Executive Branch in cases that impact
foreign policy still informs the Court’s jurisprudence.56
2. The Antiterrorism Act (“ATA”)
The ATA establishes a civil remedy for victims of international terrorism

49. See id. (including in addition to U.S. nationals, members of the armed forces,
government employees, and contractors).
50. See id. (assuming the claimant has standing).
51. See 28 U.S.C. at §§ 1610, 1611 (1976) (noting the FSIA provides narrower
exceptions to immunity for the attachment and execution of assets than for sovereigns).
52. See id. (providing that a foreign state is entitled to a secondary analysis of
whether its assets may be attached even when a state fails to appear).
53. See Praven Banker Assocs. Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 85456 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting the narrower exceptions to immunity for the attachment of
assets allows courts to exercise more discretion preserving diplomatic relations).
54. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689, 701-02 (2004)
(highlighting that while the FSIA’s framework always applies, the executive’s views
merit great deference).
55. See id. at 696 (holding immunity reflects the current political realities and
relationships and is a gesture of comity).
56. See American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (discussing
the President’s “vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our [U.S.] foreign
relations”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (relying on
the holding of Altmann as an indication that federal courts should give serious weight
to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy).
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and criminalizes harboring and providing material support for terrorists.57
The ATA’s focus on cutting off “material support” for terrorism suggests
that it aims not only to compensate victims for their injuries but also to cut
off vital sources of terrorist funding.58 To that end, section 2333(a)
provides treble damages to successful plaintiffs.59
Although the statute expressly empowers U.S. nationals to file a private
cause of action, exactly who an individual may sue is ambiguous.60 Rather
than define the liable actor, section 2331(1) focuses on the nature of the
act.61 As a result, victims of terrorist attacks have attempted to hold banks,
corporations, and countries liable for terrorist acts under the ATA.62 Such
cases have succeeded on some occasions, mostly where the defendant was
a state sponsor of terrorism.63 In practice, the Act’s ambiguous language
has also opened the door for plaintiffs to sue on a basis of secondary
liability for acts of international terrorism.64
Whether the ATA allows for claims under secondary liability is a point
of contention.65 In Rothstein v. USB AG, the Second Circuit held that the
ATA does not support civil aiding-and-abetting liability.66 The Court
reasoned that, because section 2333 does not speak to aiding-and-abetting
liability, congressional intent to impose such liability should not be
57. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2338 (1990) (providing civil remedies for American
victims of international terrorism).
58. See, e.g., Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th
Cir. 2008); Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 55-57 (D.D.C. 2010)
(looking to the legislature describing the ATA as a “tool in the arsenal” against fighting
terrorist states).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012) (ensuring punitive damages are awarded by
requiring treble damages and attorney’s fees).
60. See id. (providing any U.S. national may sue but failing to describe who may
be sued, thus leaving the action open ended).
61. See id. at § 2331(1) (defining “international terrorism” in the act’s definition
section and its elements but not the actor against whom a suit can be brought).
62. See Steve Vladeck, The 9/11 Civil Litigation and the Justice Against Sponsors
of Terrorism Act (JASTA), JUST SEC. (Apr. 18, 2016, 8:02 AM), http://bit.ly/2goCAVB
[hereinafter Vladeck, 9/11 Litigation] (outlining how litigants have capitalized on the
lack of clarity in the ATA to hold banks liable that fund terrorism).
63. See Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32–37 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding damages to
plaintiffs suing Iran).
64. See Anti-Terrorism Act Liability for Financial Institutions, SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL LLP, 1 (Sept. 24, 2014), http://bit.ly/2g4XJnd (noting the surge in cases
brought against banks in the last decade).
65. See id. at 4 (noting disagreement between the Second Circuit and other courts
over secondary liability within the ATA).
66. 708 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiff’s chain of inferences
was too far attenuated to show proximate cause).
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inferred.67
However, the Seventh Circuit interpreted a more expansive holding
in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development, characterizing
aiding-and-abetting as “primary liability . . . [with] the character of
secondary liability.”68 Under this view, to be liable for terrorism an actor
providing material support must know the money will be used in
preparation for or in carrying out the tortious act on an American citizen
abroad.69 In other words, to establish liability, the plaintiff must prove
intentional misconduct of a bank or other entity.70 These decisions have
made it difficult for plaintiffs to use the ATA as a means to hold Saudi
Arabia civilly liable for the 9/11 attacks.71
3. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) was designed
to change U.S. law pertaining to foreign sovereign immunity and make it
easier for the 9/11 victims to sue the government of Saudi Arabia and
foreign financial institutions suspected of providing material support to the
9/11 hijackers.72 JASTA proposed to amend the FSIA and ATA so courts
would not dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction or failing to
show primary liability.73 Although much of what JASTA purported to do
has been excised through subsequent revisions, the act does amend the
ATA to allow aiding-and-abetting liability for acts of terrorism committed,
planned, or organized by an organization designated as a foreign terrorist
organization (FTO).74 Additionally, it creates a cause of action against

67. See Anti-Terrorism Act Liability for Financial Institutions, supra note 64 at 3
(discussing how the Rothstein holding will require proximate cause).
68. See Vladeck, 9/11 Litigation, supra note 62 (summarizing the Court’s analysis
in Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)).
69. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.
2008) (holding that giving money to a terrorist organization is not intentional
misconduct unless one either knows or is indifferent to this knowledge).
70. See id. (arguing that when the facts known of an organization show a high
probability that it is engaging in terrorism, a person cannot plead ignorance to this
risk).
71. See Vladeck, 9/11 Litigation, supra note 62 (summarizing the legal history of
9/11 litigants’ attempts to hold Saudi Arabia liable for the attacks).
72. See id. (summarizing the legislative intent behind JASTA as a means to
counter the existing sovereign immunity framework, particularly for 9/11 plaintiffs).
73. See Press Release, supra note 22 (advocating for JASTA to correct the
“egregious” errors of the ATA and FSIA and create a cause of action that will allow
families to “take their attackers” to court).
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of State to designate an
organization as an FTO if the Secretary finds that it is a) foreign and b) engaged in
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foreign states for injury arising from an act of international terrorism,
regardless of where the act occurred.75 JASTA retains, however, immunity
for claims falling under the FSIA for foreign sovereigns.76
In contrast to its legislative purpose, JASTA is relatively limited as a
result of significant amendments to the bill that excised additional bars to
immunity.77 However, its existing provisions significantly undermine longstanding principles of sovereign immunity, which are integral to
international law and comity between states.78 Moreover, its passage
indicates a disregard for these principles that has resonated
internationally.79

III. ANALYSIS
A. JASTA is Imprudent Law Because It Cannot Meaningfully Alter
Victims of Terrorism Chances for Reparation, Yet Opens the Door
for Litigation that Undermines American Counter-Terrorism
Policy.
1. JASTA Does Not Overturn Prior Judicial Decisions That Rejected
Personal Jurisdiction Over Past Defendants in 9/11 Litigation Nor
Significantly Changes Modes of Liability Under the ATA.
JASTA’s amendments to the ATA and the FSIA broadly change
principles of sovereign immunity, which affects the law of nations while
achieving little for the limited class of people the Act intends to serve.80

terrorist activity as defined in § 1182(a)(3)(B)).
75. See JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 4(b), 130 Stat. 852, 854 (2016)
(amending the FSIA to include 28 U.S.C. § 1605B, or “JASTA claims”).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2) (1992) (barring suits against foreign states or agents
acting under color of law).
77. See Steve Vladeck, The Senate Killed JASTA, Then Passed It. . ., JUST SEC.
(May 18, 2016), http://bit.ly/2f93jk8 [hereinafter Vladeck, JASTA] (arguing that
redrafting JASTA largely denuded it of its legal effect).
78. See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on S. 2040 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
114th Cong. 64 (2016) (statement of Paul B. Stephan, Professor of Law, University of
Virginia Law School) [hereinafter Stephan Statement] (stating JASTA derogates from
international law principles of sovereign immunity that are viewed as illegal
internationally).
79. See id. (noting JASTA has caused furor even from U.S. allies).
80. See id. (arguing that while the version of JASTA passed in the House and
Senate largely denudes the original bill, it still undermines international law).
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For many 9/11 plaintiffs, it has no legal effect at all.81 As initially drafted,
JASTA would have amended the ATA to expressly allow personal
jurisdiction over any individual for acts of international terrorism in which
a U.S. citizen “suffers injury in his or her person, property, or business.”82
This would have lessened the burden for plaintiffs who were required to
show a foreign state has sufficient minimum contacts for personal
jurisdiction by proving the state aimed its tortious conduct at the United
States.83 However, as enacted, JASTA’s personal jurisdiction amendment
is eliminated.84
Excising per se jurisdiction is crucially significant for those JASTA
purports to serve because U.S. courts have already dismissed several suits
against Saudi officials for lack of personal jurisdiction.85 By maintaining
the ATA’s silence over personal jurisdiction, litigants have no new means
to reopen lawsuits that were dismissed for failing to prove sufficient
contacts between foreign defendants and the plaintiff.86 For many litigants,
this frustrates JASTA’s aim of amending “bad decisions” and offering
redress for “improper” court decisions that dismissed 9/11 litigation for
lack of jurisdiction.87
Two other proposed amendments to the ATA similarly fall short of
JASTA’s legally improper aims of changing existing law.88 First, as
initially proposed, JASTA sought to amend the ATA by repealing the
prohibition on suits against a foreign state, agency, or official acting under

81. See id. (noting that without the personal jurisdiction provision, JASTA will not
overrule prior judicial decisions that dismissed 9/11 victim’s civil suits).
82. Compare H.R. 3143, 113th Cong. (2013) (giving personal jurisdiction in U.S.
courts for any claims in accordance with § 2333), with JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222
(excising de facto jurisdiction from the Act thereby preserving prior judicial decisions
that blocked jurisdiction).
83. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that a
defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with a place to establish personal
jurisdiction).
84. See JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 4(a), 130 Stat. 852, 854 (2016) (preserving
the court’s analysis under the ATA of whether personal jurisdiction exists).
85. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539,
575-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting defendant’s Prince Naif’s motion to dismiss, and
noting the issue of personal jurisdiction was “relatively straightforward”).
86. See JASTA § 4(a) (creating no new basis for 9/11 litigants to challenge
previous rulings).
87. See id. § 2 (stating JASTA would rectify the Second Circuit “improperly
blocked” terrorism-related claims by requiring an unfair strict proximate causation
test).
88. See id. § 4(a) (excluding the language from sections five and six of H.R. 3143,
113th Cong. (2013)).
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color of legal authority.89 Second, it would have amended the ATA to
allow aiding-and-abetting liability in cases arising from an act of terrorism
“committed, planned, or authorized” by a state designated as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO).90 Because the ATA does not explicitly
specify against whom liability may be pursued, this amendment would
have clarified allowable modes of liability against sovereigns.91 Further,
the proposed change to the ATA would have overruled the Second
Circuit’s ruling limiting ATA claims where defendants are not directly
responsible for the underlying act of terrorism.92
As proposed, JASTA retains 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2), which prohibits ATA
claims against “a foreign state,” such as Saudi Arabia.93 Further, under
section 4(a), JASTA makes it more difficult to hold foreign sovereigns
liable under an aiding-and-abetting theory by limiting its application in a
manner that excludes liable sovereigns.94 Section 4(a) extends liability for
“any injury arising from an act of international terrorism, committed,
planned, or authorized by” an FTO to any person who knowingly aids and
abets—provides substantial assistance.95 A definition section follows this,
stipulating that courts interpret “person” using the definition in U.S.C. Title
1 § 1, which does not include sovereigns.96 Operationally, this excludes
Saudi Arabia and other foreign states from aiding-or-abetting liability in
most cases.97
However, JASTA would strip immunity for sovereigns for acts that fall
within section 1605B, which creates “JASTA claims” (i.e. claims against a
foreign state for physical injury or death caused by a terrorist act)
regardless of where the tortious act occurred.98 Nonetheless, JASTA
89. See H.R. 3143, 113th Cong. § 6 (2013) (proposing to remove § 2337 of the
ATA that bars suits against foreign sovereigns).
90. See id. § 4 (proposing to amend § 2333 of the ATA).
91. See JASTA § 4(a) (allowing for secondary liability in some instances).
92. See Rothstein v. USB AG, 708 F.3d 82, 88, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2013) (creating
binding authority on all cases in the Second Circuit that bars ATA cases pursuing
secondary liability).
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2) (1992) (barring suits against foreign heads of state
and government officials acting under color of law).
94. See JASTA § 4(a) (diminishing JASTA’s usefulness to 9/11 litigants).
95. See id. (implying that the definitional inclusion effectively closes the door on a
broader interpretation of “persons” that could have included foreign sovereigns).
96. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “person” to include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, joint stock companies, and individuals).
97. See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 4(a) (hinting that legislators may have been
uneasy with allowing a private cause of action of secondary liability against head of
state).
98. See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 4(a) (2016) (allowing sovereigns to be sued
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maintains a cause of action against a foreign state pursuant to the ATA’s
general bar on suits against foreign sovereigns.99 The potential for claims
under § 1605B is thus inhibited by the restrictive drafting of § 4, limiting
aiding-and-abetting liability to private litigants.100 In practice, claims
pursued under JASTA against foreign sovereigns will require a showing of
primary liability, a high bar for holding foreign sovereigns liable and an
ongoing hurdle for 9/11 litigants.101
2. Section Five Allows for Post Facto Executive Intervention to Stay
JASTA Litigation, However, It Cannot Prevent Private Litigants From
Initiating Suits
Because JASTA is more of a political message than a coherent piece of
legislation, the Act undermines itself by including a “Stay of Actions” that
allows for executive intervention.102 Specifically, under section 5, courts
may grant a 180-day stay if the Secretary of State certifies that the United
States is engaged in “good faith” discussions to resolve litigant’s claim
against the foreign state.103
Although the initial stay request is
discretionary, courts must grant 180-day extension(s) upon re-certification
by the State Department, potentially in perpetuity.104
The Act gives no explicit parameters for what a court should consider
when deciding whether or not to grant an initial stay.105 However,
JASTA’s drafting implies that it is predicated on two actions that are both
within the control of the executive: 1) the Attorney General must intervene
to stay the action in whole or in part; and 2) the Secretary of State must
certify that the U.S. is engaged in good faith discussions with the foreign
state defendant.106 Section 5 is silent as to what outcomes a “good faith
on a theory of primary liability).
99. See id. (maintaining the ATA’s general bar on suits against foreign sovereigns
unless the claim can be characterized as a “JASTA” claim).
100. See id. (highlighting the Act’s limitations).
101. See id. (indicating that § 4 particularly hinders 9/11 litigants of 9/11 who have
based their case on an argument of indirect material support for the 9/11 hijackers).
102. See id. § 5(b) (providing for intervention by the Attorney General for staying
the action, in whole or in part).
103. See id. § 5(c)(1)-(2) (indicating a safety valve for the executive to weigh in on
foreign policy matters).
104. See id. § 5(c)(2)(B)(ii); see also Vladeck, JASTA, supra 77 (begging the
question of whether a decision to block a stay from the executive might be deemed an
abuse of discretion by the judiciary on issues of foreign policy, given the statutory
protection of maintaining the stay).
105. See JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222 (2016) (providing no definitional section).
106. See id. § 5(b)-(c) (creating “an out” to the judiciary from deciding delicate
foreign policy issues); see also Vladeck, 9/11 Litigation, supra note 62 (noting that
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discussion” may lead to.107 However, a sole executive agreement that
terminates litigation is not unlikely, particularly as the President and the
foreign state are presumably the only parties to such a discussion.108 Thus,
in practice, section 5 could partially redress executive control over sensitive
foreign policy issues in the form of executive claim settlements, albeit only
after a JASTA claim brings a foreign state to court.109
The President’s executive claim settlement power is like section 5’s
“good faith discussions” in that both are characterized by a privately settled
outcome between the President and a foreign state.110 Interpreting section 5
as analogous to the President’s executive claims settlement power is also
supported by judicial precedent and executive practice.111 The Supreme
Court has upheld executive claim settlement agreements in several cases,
most famously in Dames & Moore v. Regan arising from the President’s
use of this power during the Iranian hostage crises in 1979.112 In Dames &
Moore, the Court held that the President was permitted to use his claims
settlement power to negotiate with Iran for the return of fifty-two American
hostages in exchange for a stay of all claims in U.S. courts seeking to
attach Iranian property.113 This holding emphasizes the President’s
suitability to balance private claims that implicate sensitive foreign policy
issues with the interests of other nationals and the state.114
Furthermore, there is analogous precedent for giving the President

case law in the federal circuit, such as the Terrorist Litigation Cases, shows that judges
have thus far looked for any way possible to avoid reaching the merits of 9/11 suits).
107. See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 at § 5(c) (leaving interpretation of a good
faith discussion relatively unconstrained).
108. See Ingrid Wuerth, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Initial Analysis,
LAWFARE (Sept. 29, 2016), http://bit.ly/2fd2QAB (noting that § 5 functionally codifies
the principle of comity statutorily providing for the judicial power to stay rather than
allowing it as a matter of federal common law).
109. See Veto Message, supra note 25 (arguing JASTA reduces the effectiveness of
foreign policy by taking sensitive foreign policy matters away from the executive and
national security professionals and placing them in the hands of private litigants and
courts).
110. See Wuerth, supra note 108 (suggesting § 5 is an implicit endorsement of the
President’s claim settlement power by its very nature).
111. See e.g., Dames and Moore v. Regan 453 U.S. 654, 686-91 (1981) (allowing
for an intrusion by the executive into federal court litigation during fragile negotiations
with Iran regarding the return of hostages).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 683-89 (positing that claims settlement and foreign sovereign
immunity doctrines are complementary and have supported executive actions).
114. See id. at 661-62 (arguing that good policy requires the claim of the individual
to yield to the overriding demands of the group on some occasions).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

15

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
HOLCOMBE 3/9/2017(DO NOT DELETE)

374

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

5/23/2017 7:33 PM

[Vol. 25:3

authority to preserve immunity for foreign states in delicate foreign affairs
through executive intervention.115 Within the 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), amendments to the FSIA were drafted that
listed Iraq as a sponsor of terror.116 The legislation could have been
utilized against Iraq for acts of terrorism during the Saddam Hussein
regime.117 The amendment would have exposed Iraq by creating a federal
cause of action with a possibility of punitive damages to support claims
that previously would have been foreclosed through sovereign immunity. 118
Over White House and Iraqi objections, Congress passed NDAA with the
FSIA amendments, leading President Bush to veto the legislation.119 After
consultation with the executive branch, Congress re-passed NDAA but
included a Presidential option to waive the provision with respect to
Iraq.120 In doing so, Congress implicitly recognized that policies that
implicate national security and foreign relations rightly trigger the
executive’s powers to intervene.121
As section 5 does not explicitly preclude a “good faith discussion”
leading to an executive settlement agreement, the executive could rely on
precedent, such as Dames & Moore and Bush’s veto of NDAA, on the
basis that JASTA similarly imperils larger national interests.122 For
example, where Dames & Moore provided for the executive to stay the
attachment of Iranian assets on unrelated private claims suits, a similar
rationale should be employed to indefinitely stay 9/11 litigants’ claims
115. See H.R. 1585 110th Cong. § 1083 (2007) (reiterating the continued respect
courts have shown for the executive’s powers to settle sensitive diplomatic issues).
116. See id. (undermining foreign policy and commercial interests of the United
States in Iraq by creating a cause of action against it).
117. See Press Release, Memorandum of Disapproval, President George W. Bush
(Dec. 28, 2007), http://bit.ly/2gsejPk [hereinafter Memorandum] (citing concerns that
the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), and commercial
entities in the United States in which Iraq has an interest would be threatened).
118. See id. (highlighting § 1083 includes provisions that “for the first time in
history” would have exposed a foreign sovereign to punitive damages contrary to
international legal norms and for the first time in U.S. history).
119. See id. (revealing a similar executive interest to the Obama Administration’s
interest in blocking legislation that disrupts relations between states and principles of
sovereign immunity).
120. See id. (requiring the President to determine that: (A) the waiver is in the
national security interest of the United States; (B) will promote relations between the
U.S. and Iraq; and (C) Iraq continues to be a reliable ally of the U.S.).
121. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(recognizing a difference in the role of government in foreign affairs and domestic
affairs).
122. See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 5 (leaving interpretation of “good faith”
discussion open ended).
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against Saudi Arabia so as not to endanger the operative framework of
sovereign immunity.123
Further, the waiver option provided to Bush is analogous to how section
5 will function in practice, allowing the executive to intervene when
sensitive foreign policy issues are at stake.124 Since Congressional intent
for executive intervention was inferred in Dames & Moore and authorized
explicitly under remarkably similar circumstances in Bush’s waiver
provision, precedent and practice supports an interpretation of section 5
leading to executive claim settlement.125
Finally, allowing for executive claims settlement through section 5 of
JASTA would not disrupt the framework of diplomatic protections afforded
under the FSIA.126 While the FSIA was enacted to codify immunities so
that their application could be made dependably, it makes no reference to
claims settlement agreements, subjecting its parameters only to existing
international agreements, rather than future agreements.127
This
construction supports a reading of section 5 that indicates executive claims
settlement is not barred.128 Rather, section 5 implicitly invites an executive
remedy that is independent from the congressionally and judicially
fashioned remedies under JASTA.129
Section 5 places the executive in the position of mitigating damage to its
diplomatic relationships post facto rather than preemptively interceding
cases that could have serious foreign policy implications.130 It is improper

123. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684-85 (1981), (enshrining the
historical right of the executive to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign
governments for the purpose of keeping peace with those governments).
124. See JASTA § 5(c) (providing for executive intervention and stay of litigation
that is functionally analogous to Presidential intervention in the form of claims
settlement).
125. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654; see also Memorandum, supra note 117
(registering successfully the executive’s concerns over how NADAA would disrupt
relations with not only Iraq, but also the international community, and a grant for
executive waiver).
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1992) (clarifying that the FSIA is subject to
international agreements).
127. See id. (subjecting the FSIA framework to “existing international agreements”
to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment).
128. See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 4(a), 130 Stat. 852, 854 (2016) (recalling
that JASTA amends the FSIA and should thus now be considered part of its
framework).
129. See Wuerth, supra note 108 (tracing the likelihood of “discussions” leading to
an agreement that could easily call for the termination of litigation).
130. See id. (begging the question of how “good faith” discussions would happen in
practice when diplomatic norms have been violated).
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that, under JASTA, it is sufficient to plead terrorism to haul a sovereign
state into court, whatever the merits or foreign policy ramifications.131
However, while section 5 offers a degree of executive intervention, it does
not prevent a foreign state being brought to a U.S. court at the behest of a
private litigant.132
3. Recovery Under JASTA Is Remote Because the FSIA Affords Broader
Immunity to Foreign-State-Owned Assets and the Executive Rightfully Has
Waiver Powers.
Tension between the theories of absolute and restrictive immunity is at
its highest within the FSIA’s treatment of foreign assets.133 Special
protection for foreign assets held within the United States was codified
within the FSIA because “the international community viewed execution
against a foreign state’s property as a greater affront to its sovereignty than
merely permitting jurisdiction over the merits of an action.”134 At the time
of the FSIA’s enactment, Congress accepted the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity as an accepted practice of international law.135
However, the enforcement of judgments against foreign states remained a
controversial subject that courts, as well as policymakers, were hesitant to
allow without due consideration.136 This concern is reflected in the
additional analysis required under the FSIA for immunity from prejudgment attachment of assets and post-judgment execution.137
Under the FSIA, the property of a foreign state in the United States is
presumptively immune so even if jurisdiction is established over a foreign
state, a resulting judgment is not necessarily enforceable.138 This reflects
131. See Veto Message, supra note 25 (noting JASTA permits litigation against
states that have neither been designated by the executive branch as state sponsors of
terrorism, nor taken direct action against the United States).
132. See JASTA § 5(b) (emphasizing intervention happens after a foreign state is
made subject to the jurisdiction of a court of the United States).
133. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-11 (1976) (providing narrower exceptions to immunity
for attachments and execution than for jurisdiction).
134. See Walters v. Indus. & Commer. Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240,
255-56 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that judicial seizure of a foreign state’s property may be
regarded as an affront to its dignity and may affect U.S. relations with it).
135. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976) (providing that acts of state should be
distinguished from commercial acts).
136. See Walters, 651 F.3d 280 at 289 (tracing the reasoning of the FSIA’s broader
protections to sovereign property than sovereigns themselves).
137. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-11 (observing that the asymmetry between jurisdiction
and execution immunity in the FSIA reflects a deliberate congressional choice).
138. See id. (setting forth the limited exceptions to the attachment of assets that are
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the statutory presumption in favor of immunity from attachment and
execution.139
Under section 1609 of the FSIA, even when a court enters a valid
judgment, the property of a foreign state is subject only to attachment and
execution as specifically provided in sections 1610 and 1611.140 Certain
types of property such as embassies, consulates, and their bank accounts,
are generally protected under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic
Relations and Consular Relations.141 Further, under section 1610(c), the
FSIA prevents attachment or execution against foreign states until the court
determines a reasonable period of time has elapsed following an entry of
judgment against a foreign state.142 This affords a foreign state time to
react to the judgment and for the courts to exercise discretion in how a
judgment will be collected or waived at the behest of the executive.143
In sum, the execution of judgments under the FSIA is in practice more
aligned with absolute immunity.144 This has not gone unnoticed by the
Court, which observed that “the asymmetry between jurisdiction and
execution” of attaching assets under the FSIA reflects a “deliberate
congressional choice” to create a “right without a remedy” in
circumstances where there is jurisdiction over a foreign state but its
property is immune.145
However, in the last twenty years Congress has pushed back on the
FSIA’s presumption of immunity for sovereign assets on several occasions
reflecting less favor for soft power diplomacy tactics of the 20th-century.146
narrower for assets than for sovereigns themselves).
139. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010)
(shifting the burden to plaintiffs to establish an exception to immunity).
140. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610-11 (stating that the property of a foreign state is never
automatically subject to attachment or execution based on the underlying judgment).
141. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 22, Apr. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 (providing that the property of the mission be immune from search,
requisition, attachment, or execution).
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (starting the “reasonable period of time” after notice
has been given to the foreign state).
143. See, e.g., Pravin Banker Assocs. Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850,
853 (2d Cir. 1997) (granting two stays before granting summary judgment).
144. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (defining the
notion of sovereign immunity as consonant with the usages and accepted obligations of
the civilized world).
145. See Walters v. Indus. & Commer. Bank of China Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d
Cir. 2011) (holding the “right without a remedy” is a reflection of Congress’s view of
sovereignty expressed in the United Nations Charter that left the availability of
execution up to the debtor state).
146. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(3) (2003) (attempting to remove immunities
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These efforts have been repeatedly curtailed by the executive, tasked with
protecting the interests of the United States, and maintaining national
security, which hinges on harmonious relations with foreign states.147
Legislation like the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) reflects
Congress’s efforts to scale back the protections afforded to foreign assets
under the FSIA.148 TRIA creates a cause of action that uses assets from a
foreign state to satisfy a successful judgment against it for damages arising
from an act of terrorism.149 It also statutorily prohibits the President from
categorically barring foreign assets for attachment through Presidential
waiver, and requires him to make an “asset-by-asset” determination.150
Like the ATA, the TRIA is designed in part to provide economic deterrence
to foreign states that sponsor terrorist attacks.151 It does this by using
foreign assets to cover the costs of insurance the act provides.152 The
deterrence effect is questionable, as only certain assets are immune from
waiver.153 Moreover, most foreign states’ assets are covered by the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, allowing the President to block attachment if foreign
policy goals so dictate.154
Whether assets can be attached or not creates an imbalance issue with
the TRIA and the FSIA in general; some plaintiffs will be able to collect
while similarly situated plaintiffs will not.155 Further, attempts by Congress
afforded to foreign state assets).
147. See Memorandum, supra note 117 (reflecting the Bush Administration’s
concerns about penalizing Iraq financially as the state was being rebuilt and relations
were normalizing with the United States).
148. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), Pub. L. 107–297, 116 Stat. 2322
(2002) (providing for the attachment of assets in order to satisfy judgments to the
extent of damages a terrorist party has been adjudged liable).
149. See id. § 201(a) (providing a means for litigants to seek damages from a
foreign state notwithstanding the immunities afforded to the attachment of assets under
FSIA).
150. See id. § 201(b) (preserving a waiver for national security reasons, but making
it harder for the president to utilize the waiver).
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1992) (providing civil remedies in treble as well as
attorney’s fees to successful plaintiffs).
152. See TRIA § 107 (attempting to satisfy judgments for tortious claims arising out
of terrorism by the liable state’s assets).
153. See id. at § 201(b)(1) (allowing the President to waive the required attachment
of assets against any property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic or
Consular Relations).
154. See id. (recalling that the Vienna Convention is a pre-existing treaty obligation,
breach of which would most certainly be seen as a violation of international law).
155. See Jeewon Kim, Making State Sponsors of Terrorism Pay: A Separation of
Powers Discourse Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L
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to chip away at the FSIA’s protection of foreign assets does not consider
that foreign assets held in the U.S. are finite.156 At the time of TRIA’s
passage, Iran, the most commonly sued state, had only had $251.9 million
in frozen assets, which is an insufficient amount to cover compensatory
damages for existing judgments.157
Foreign states are not ignorant of how the United States proposes to
satisfy judgments.158 For instance, Saudi Arabia has made statements that
it would remove its assets if Congress passed JASTA.159 Therefore, when
plaintiffs succeed in securing judgments, it is probable that not all will
receive payment.160 This creates inequities in how similarly situated
nationals with similar claims are compensated because funds will
eventually run out.161
Increasing the number of litigants dependent on finite attachable foreign
assets to satisfy their judgment also undermines the basic tenant of
remedy.162 Plaintiffs initiate litigation in the hope that a court will find in
their favor and will award them damages or reparations.163 However, the
L. 513, 523 (2004) (positing that the FSIA and amendments like TRIA are flawed
because they frustrate victims and pits the executive against plaintiffs).
156. See id. at 524 (noting if plaintiffs are successful, the blocked assets of foreign
states will eventually run out).
157. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37
(D.D.C. 2009) (noting the amount of Iranian assets within the United States is
approximately $45 million, while outstanding judgments against Iran stand at $10
billion dollars).
158. See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(noting that Syria feared that successful plaintiffs who had won judgments in federal
court would seek to attach ancient artifacts belonging to Syria on loan to the
Metropolitan Museum of Art).
159. See Mark Mazzetti, Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress
Passes
9/11
Bill,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
15
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-warnsofeconomic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9-11-bill.html (reporting Saudi Arabia warned
the Obama Administration it will sell off billions of dollars-worth of American assets
held by the kingdom).
160. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 58
(holding that expanding exceptions to immunity means that liability in the form of
billions of dollars will quickly become insurmountable for defendant states).
161. See Kim, supra note 155, at 524 (noting that the Deputy Secretary of the
Department of the Treasury testified that the TRIA creates “gross inequities” for
plaintiffs).
162. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting early on that the FSIA complicates our legal system by allowing plaintiffs to
seek remedies that are necessarily barred for important foreign policy reasons).
163. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring that factual contentions by the plaintiff have
evidentiary support and are based on a reasonable belief, generally barring suits that
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prospects for recovery in FSIA cases are extremely remote and unequally
granted when assets can be attached.164 JASTA ignores this reality and
grows the pool of litigants trying to track down attachable assets by making
it easier to bring suit under the FSIA.165 As JASTA does not recognize any
of these hurdles, the legislation will not achieve its stated purpose of
benefitting victims of terrorism.166 Further, it will exacerbate longrecognized policy problems of allowing litigants to seek reparations from
foreign states at all.167
B. JASTA Dangerously Disrupts the Principle of Sovereign Immunity and
The Separation of Power Doctrine by Limiting the Executive’s Control
Over Foreign Policy.
JASTA problematically disrupts the separation of powers.168 Fighting
terrorism and the exercise of diplomatic relations are traditionally within
the purview of the executive branch, although Congress plays a supportive
role.169 However, rather than wait for the executive and Congress to
determine which states merit listing as state sponsors of terrorism, JASTA
allows private litigants to leapfrog the political branches by alleging a
foreign state is responsible for a terrorist act.170 This opens the door for
litigants, whose interests do not necessarily match those of our nation as a
whole, to bring foreign states into court.171 Once a suit is initiated, the

lack basis).
164. See Kim, supra note 155, at 524 (noting the FSIA mostly frustrates victims and
adding further exceptions to immunities only exacerbates the problem).
165. See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2(b) (seeking to give civil litigants “the
broadest possible basis” to seek relief against foreign states).
166. See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 67 (noting JASTA does not deal with
the broader immunities pertaining to the attachment of assets).
167. See id. at 67-68 (arguing litigation under the FSIA is not sustainable).
168. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37
(D.D.C. 2009) (holding civil actions against foreign states confront “fundamental
understandings” of foreign state sovereignty and conflict with the exercise of
presidential power in the realm of foreign affairs).
169. See U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2. (making the President “Commander in Chief” and
delegating the President power to “make Treaties,” to “appoint Ambassadors, and to
“receive Ambassadors and other public ministers”).
170. See Veto Message, supra note 25 (critiquing how JASTA permit litigation
against countries that have neither been designated by the executive branch as state
sponsors of terrorism nor taken direct actions in the United States).
171. Compare FSIA § 1605A(a)(1) (2008) (barring immunity for claims against
states designated as FTOs by the State Department for specified acts of terrorism), with
JASTA § 3(a) (2016) (allowing for claims “regardless of where the tortious act of the
foreign state occurred” and regardless of their FTO status).
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executive loses control over the process and leaves these careful
determinations in the hands of private citizens and district courts.172
Removing these determinations from the executive does not advance the
cause of identifying state sponsors of terrorism, and it further interferes
with the executive’s foreign policy efforts.173
The executive has an interest in keeping foreign states out of courts for a
number of reasons.174 Despite the fact that judges must hear evidence
before entering judgment, the implied unfairness of these proceedings is
questionable, particularly as foreign defendants rarely appear to defend
themselves.175 Although the jurisprudence of the courts has thus far limited
modes of liability in keeping with the FSIA’s presumption of immunity,
courts run the risk of undermining their impartiality to satisfy the public’s
demand for justice to victims of terrorism.176
Keeping foreign states out of court is also in the interest of the executive
because liquidating the assets of foreign states disrupts diplomatic relations
and lessens political leverage.177 Preventing such disruption and instability
has been a concern of the executive branch, particularly with “rogue
states.”178 As President Clinton explained when he utilized his presidential
waiver to bar attachment of Iranian assets, the executive’s control over
foreign assets is a necessary component of a flexible and responsive foreign
policy.179 Further, when a foreign state is unable to pay billions it owes due
172. See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 63 (testifying JASTA strips the
executive branch of the authority given to it by Congress to identify threats to the
U.S.).
173. See id. (stating this shift of power gravely compromises U.S. security
interests).
174. See generally Part B (interpreting JASTA’s impact on the separation of powers
as a detriment of national security).
175. But see Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 754
(2d Cir. 1998); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2000)
(entering judgments against Libya and Iraq in rare exception to the usual default
judgment).
176. See Kim, supra note 155, at 526 (arguing that the nature of terrorism suits runs
the risk of politicizing Judges against “pariah states”).
177. See Walters v. Indus. & Commerce Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d
Cir. 2011) (highlighting the view that great seizure of a state’s property may undermine
relations).
178. See Kim, supra note 155 at 526 (writing the Clinton Administration
“strenuously” objected to TRIA’s aim of letting plaintiff’s attach foreign assets to
satisfy judgments).
179. See id. at 527 (noting Congress recognized the importance of leveraging frozen
assets when it created the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §
1701-06 (2003) and Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-6, 7-39, 41-44
(2003), and noting that Carter’s ability to freeze $12 billion of Iranian assets during the
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to terrorism suits, this prevents relations from thawing, whether or not this
is in the interest of the state.180 JASTA undermines and exacerbates these
concerns by making it easier for litigants to bring foreign states to court
seeking individual “justice.”181
The passage of JASTA illustrates a Congressional shift away from the
executive branch’s long-recognized powers in the sphere of foreign
affairs.182 When compared to the interplay between the two branches in
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, arising from the Bush Administration’s pushback
against the NDAA, JASTA reveals a significant step into the domain of the
executive.183 In Beaty, the Court was asked to resolve conflict between
congressional intent to create victim-friendly legislation and executive
obligations to a foreign state.184 Congress’s initial attempt to amend the
FSIA’s terrorism exception directly conflicted with President Bush’s
foreign policy goals in Iraq.185 The proposed amendment would have
applied to current and past designated state sponsors of terrorism,
potentially opening Iraq to suit, although it had been delisted.186 When
Congress failed to include a presidential waiver provision, which would
allow President Bush to waive the bill’s applicability to Iraq, he vetoed the
bill.187 Ultimately, the bill was redrafted to include a provision satisfying

Iranian hostage crises hinged on his ability to leverage these assets).
180. See id. at 526-27 (arguing that this is the central policy concern of the
executive because it reduced the likelihood of using diplomatic channels in the future
to resolve disputes).
181. See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2(a)(1), (7) (positing that the Act reflects
the U.S.’s “vital interest” in providing individuals “full access” to the court system, in
contrast to the executive’s concerns articulated in the Presidential Veto).
182. See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 63 (testifying that JASTA strips the
executive branch of its proper authority to address terrorism, which is mostly effected
by external relations).
183. See Memorandum, supra note 117 (vetoing the NDAA on the basis that it
disrupts relations between states and principles of sovereign immunity). See generally
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 851 (2009).
184. See generally Republic of Iraq, 556 U.S. at 851 (providing President Bush to
exercise his authority to the fullest extent to declare Iraq “inapplicable” to the FSIA §
620A so that it could be rebuilt).
185. See Memorandum, supra note 117 (stating to subject Iraq to litigation in U.S.
courts or hold it liable for terrorist acts would undermine improving relations and
stabilization of the region).
186. See Republic of Iraq, 556 U.S. at 863 (noting that to prevent the President from
using his waiver authority would imperil billions of dollars of Iraqi assets).
187. See id. at 854 (citing Bush’s Memorandum to the House of Representatives
Returning Without Approval the NDAA, unless the law recognized all provisions “with
respect to Iraq”).
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President Bush’s demands.188
Although the Supreme Court conceded that it could not say with
certainty whether President Bush was correct in his view that exposing Iraq
to damages would jeopardize the reconstruction of the state, it noted courts
should be “wary of overriding apparent statutory text supported by
executive interpretation in favor of speculation about a law’s true purpose”
that falls within the “complicated” and “delicate” realm of foreign
affairs.189 This determination emphasizes the judiciary and congressional
acquiescence to granting the President the power to suspend the operation
of a valid law in the sphere of foreign affairs.190 The Court found “the
granting of Presidential waiver authority . . . particularly apt with respect to
congressional elimination of foreign sovereign immunity, since the
granting or denial of that immunity was historically the case-by-case
prerogative of the Executive Branch.”191 Although this left some victims
unable to proceed with suit against Iraq, larger policy interests articulated
by the executive to stabilize Iraq were favored.192
The Court’s holding in Beaty emphasizes the practical and functional
rationales for affording the executive branch greater leeway in the
maintenance of diplomatic relations for the benefit of national security. 193
Scholars have argued that, in the realm of foreign affairs, the executive
possesses extraconstitutional powers against the backdrop of national
security considerations.194 The executive is directly afforded power
through Article II section 2 of the Constitution to “make Treaties,”
“appoint Ambassadors,” and to “receive Ambassadors and other public

188. See Memorandum, supra note 117 (conditioning his acceptance of the NDAA
on inclusion of the waiver).
189. See Republic of Iraq, 556 U.S. at 860 (noting that the executive’s powers to
implement sovereign immunities is based on political realities and relationships).
190. See id. at 856 (noting that while “to a layperson” the notion of the President’s
suspension of valid law “may seem strange,” the practice is “well-established, at least
in the sphere of foreign affairs”).
191. See id. at 857 (citing to Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-590 (1943)).
192. See id. at 863 (holding it would be “perplexing” to convert Iraq’s billion-dollar
reconstruction project “into a compensation scheme” for a limited group of victims).
193. See id. at 858 (noting that the Court canvassed precedents from as early as the
“inception of the national government” in support of the executive’s powers to suspend
operation of law in the sphere of foreign affairs).
194. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1935)
(asserting in Justice Sutherland’s dicta that the “powers of external sovereignty did not
depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution,” but rather are “vested in the
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality” and locating those
powers in the president).
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ministers.”195 These reflect the President’s domestic powers to create
international obligations for the United States in his capacity as the nation’s
“constitutional representative” in foreign affairs.196
The Court has also highlighted the executive’s superior position with
respect to fact gathering as a compelling reason for granting the President
sole authority in the arena of international relations.197 Therefore, in
addition to constitutional arguments, there are pragmatic factors that tip the
balance of foreign-relations control in the executive’s favor.198 A
combination of these observations supports the argument that, because the
Constitution does not articulate which political branch is directly
responsible for shaping and executing U.S. foreign policy, the executive
branch should be allowed to exercise de facto primary control in the arena
of foreign affairs.199 This comports with historical precedent: when
determining whether a foreign state could assert the defense of sovereign
immunity in a U.S. court, the historic judicial practice had been to defer to
the executive’s recommendations.200
The Supreme Court has long held that the President has plenary and
exclusive authority over the conduct of foreign affairs.201 This does not
mean that the executive is the “sole organ” in the realm of external
relations; but rather, that the branch holds significant responsibility for the
“conduct of foreign relations” and is shown necessary deference over
matters concerning national security.202 Indeed, the President’s “sole

195. See U.S. CONST. art. II § 3 (providing as well the power to “take care the
“Laws be faithfully executed”).
196. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (suggesting this characterization of the
president is a functional extension of the duties afforded to the office through the
Constitution).
197. See id. at 320 (holding the President, not Congress, has the better opportunity
of knowing the conditions that prevail in foreign countries).
198. See id. (noting the nature of foreign policy often requires immediate responses
that could not reasonably be expected from a congressional body for all diplomatic
interactions).
199. See id. (suggesting that the maintenance of our external relations is dependent
on providing the executive with a degree of discretion because sensitive information of
state cannot always reasonably be shared with Congress).
200. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010)
(articulating that determinations of immunity were traditionally made by the
executive).
201. See e.g. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1948); see also CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 317 (reminding that “though the states were several people in
respect of foreign affairs were one”).
202. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (recognizing this power as not arising
from an act of Congress).
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organ” powers were put into check in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company
v. Sawyer, particularly because the President’s attempt to seize domestic
steel mills without Congressional approval had an internal effect.203
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation emphasizes the
distinction between the application of executive powers between internal
and external affairs.204 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court suggests that the
corners of limiting executive powers externally were not as explicit when
assigning foreign policy powers because external powers do not infringe on
the rights of states.205 Even if the Constitution enumerated the executive’s
foreign affairs’ powers, the executive would still have inherited powers
beyond the Congress or Judiciary through the Executive’s ability to shape
foreign policy as the states’ constitutional representative.206 The Court
found it “apparent” that when embarrassment in the maintenance of our
international relations is to be avoided and success for our nations’ aims
achieved, congressional legislation within the international sphere should
accord the President “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction” that would not be appropriate within the domestic realm. 207
In contrast, JASTA interferes with the executive’s ability to afford
certain states immunity where policy dictates for national security
reasons.208 Whether JASTA is able to curtail sovereign immunity or not,
its bid to diminish immunity is clear.209 It attempts to move U.S. policy
further away from a presumption of immunity, as it amends the FSIA and
purports to amend the ATA.210 Comity and mutual respect for sovereignty
203. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 684-85 (1952).
But see id. at 668 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting on the basis that the external
exigencies of the Korean War justified the President’s actions for national security
reasons).
204. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315-16 (holding that the idea of the executive
being constrained by her enumerated rights is only true in the context of internal
affairs).
205. See id. at 316 (noting states never had foreign relation powers thus the foreign
affairs power of the executive emanates from another source).
206. See id. at 316, 318 (writing that as a result of the colonies separation from
Great Britain, the power over external relations passed to the United States as a single
organ).
207. See id. at 320 (highlighting particularly how JASTA fractures the executive’s
ability to control U.S. policy towards foreign states because any plaintiff can bring a
suit against any nation).
208. See Memorandum, supra note 117 (arguing that to constrict the executive from
exercising a waiver of immunity would imperil stabilization of Iraq and undermine
national security efforts aimed at the region).
209. See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2(b) (providing the “broadest” possible
basis for litigants to seek relief against foreign states).
210. See id. (purporting to scale back the protections afforded to foreign states but
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operates both ways.211 JASTA erodes this protection and departs from
longstanding standards of practice codified in the FSIA.212 It also threatens
to strip all foreign governments of immunity from judicial process based on
private litigant’s allegations, rather than executive determination.213
Instead of speaking with one unified voice, this invites the possibility that
different courts could reach varying conclusions about the culpability of
individual foreign governments and their role in terrorist activities directed
against the United States.214 Thus, JASTA promotes discordant policy in
the realm of foreign affairs and conflicts with the executive’s ability to
control its relations with foreign states.215
Additionally, by upsetting longstanding international principles of
sovereign immunity, JASTA jeopardizes the executive’s long-held powers
over national security by putting foreign nationals, the military, and
diplomatic officers of the state at risk.216 JASTA erodes the principle of
sovereign immunity, which makes the United States vulnerable to
reciprocal actions from foreign states.217 Moreover, the United States has
the most to lose through reciprocal actions because it holds more property
abroad than any other nation.218

in practice falls short of many of its aims).
211. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812) (characterizing the
notion of sovereign immunity as consonant with the accepted obligations of the
civilized world).
212. Compare JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2(b) (enlarging the means to bring
suit against a sovereign foreign state), with Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 137 (holding
that the principle of sovereign immunity is integral to successful relations between
states).
213. See Veto Message, supra note 25 (arguing that JASTA upsets longstanding
international principles regarding sovereign immunity that can globally change how
states mutually recognize sovereignty and have serious implications for U.S. national
interests).
214. Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317
(1935) (articulating that the states speak through the voice of the executive to avoid
embarrassment), with JASTA, § 2(b) (providing litigants a way to circumvent the
vetting process of the executive).
215. See Veto Message, supra note 25 (noting that evaluations of state sponsors of
terrorism are only made by careful security, policy, and intelligence considerations are
made because of the external repercussions of these decisions).
216. See id. (stating that JASTA encourages foreign governments to reciprocally
allow their domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States where the
U.S. previously enjoyed immunity through customary international law).
217. See id. (noting reciprocal actions could implicate the safety of military abroad
for allegedly causing injuries overseas through U.S. support for third-parties, such as
Saudi Arabia in Yemen or the Kurds in Syria).
218. See id. (reminding Congress that any successful judgments would be fulfilled
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Unlike the current terrorism exception in U.S. law, JASTA does not limit
litigation to cases where our government has determined that retaliation for
terrorist support is justified.219 JASTA undercuts the United States’ ability
to argue that the terrorism exception is a legitimate countermeasure
permitted by international law.220 Instead, it allows private parties to force
a foreign sovereign into court, disrupting the executive’s recognized
control over foreign policy and national security issues.221
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
JASTA should be repealed because it represents the worst of all worlds;
it exacerbates issues of terrorism by isolating the United States from its
allies in the fight against terror, and reduces comity between states overall.
Moreover, it harkens back to the reactionary policies post 9/11 that
triggered a period of “American exceptionalism” that significantly affected
international law.222 In particular, President Bush’s “war on terror”
promoted a flexible take on jus cogens norms and justified exceptions to
223
the rule of law as necessary to combat terrorism. Pundits may debate the
effectiveness of this approach but there is no doubt that it had significant
224
costs on the international reputation of the United States.
JASTA
similarly pursues policies that are in contravention to international norms,
225
and undermines the United States’ credibility as a law abiding country.
The legality of the Bush and Obama Administration’s policies in
response to terrorism were questioned by both our allies as well as our
adversaries.226 JASTA reiterates these concerns and suggests that the
by seizing U.S. assets abroad).
219. See id. (stating these are delicate political evaluations).
220. See id. (undermining existing national security policy and implicating
questions of legality under international law).
221. See Veto Message, supra note 25 (emphasizing the Obama Administration’s
necessary veto of JASTA).
222. See Christopher J. Borgen, Hearts and Minds and Laws: Legal Compliance
and Diplomatic Persuasion, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 769 (2008-2009) (attributing the
term to William Kristol, a neoconservative who advocated rejected rigid legalism when
addressing conflict areas in the world).
223. See Nagle, supra note 24 (reporting on Dutch and Iraqi outcries against
JASTA because it breaches international norms of sovereignty).
224. See Martin Kettle et al., What impact did 9/11 have on America?, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 6, 2011), http://bit.ly/2fNFsbd (reflecting on policies following 9/11 that were
viewed as unjustifiable by the international community).
225. See id. (arguing that the Bush Administration’s policy eroded fundamental
protections in the American and international legal landscape).
226. See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 65 (noting that actions viewed as
illegal by other states also subject the US to reciprocal actions under JASTA).
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United States is indifferent to longstanding principles of international
law.227 The United States’ indifference to international law, real or
imagined, has several counteractive effects on security. First, it undercuts
our legitimacy in the “fight in terror” and sows mistrust.228 Second,
JASTA’s disregard for international law encourages other states to do the
same, thereby shrinking comity between states worldwide.229 Third,
although terrorism has required the United States and other states to
reevaluate longstanding conceptions of what war and combat means, one
lesson has remained constant: the insidious nature of terrorism means that
collaboration between states is essential to combat global terrorist
230
networks.
Collaboration between states is dependent on international law – “the
231
Thus, while policies
language and grammar of international relations.”
of American exceptionalism have downplayed the importance of
international norms in matters of national security and war, these
constraints matter most internationally.232 Repealing JASTA will indicate
that the United States does not see itself as a global dictator, but rather, as a
global player.233
If the United States is going to engage collaboratively with other states it
must use reasonable polices that fit within a wider context of shared
understandings about the rule of law and international norms.234 Typically
this is referred to as “soft power,” or the ability to influence other states

227. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812) (holding that to
haul a sovereign nation to a domestic court is an affront to its sovereignty and
undermines relations between states).
228. See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 70 (arguing that to let private litigants
accuse sovereign states of terrorism as a matter of first instance discredits
counterterrorism policies).
229. See id. (arguing that JASTA erodes customary practice of international law in
regards to sovereign immunity).
230. See Borgen, supra note 222, at 774 (suggesting that to combat terrorism states
must “out-cooperate”).
231. See id. at 770 (noting that law structures the relations among states by using a
common frame of reference).
232. See id. at 770-71 (arguing international law is the common vernacular between
states, thus when it is ignored it leads to diplomatic isolation).
233. See Sheikh Jamal Al-Dhari, With Saudi-9/11 Bill, Iraqis Will Force US to
Answer For 2003 Invasion, THE HILL (Oct. 25, 2016), http://tinyurl.com/jx2xd9g
(noting that JASTA has led to the creation of Justice Against American Actions
(JAAA), a group of international lawyers organizing against American unilateralism).
234. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN
WORLD POLITICS (2004) (noting that dominant states cannot simply impose their will
on others, but must persuade through soft power means of persuasion).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss3/4

30

Holcombe: JASTA Straw Man?
HOLCOMBE 3/9/2017(DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

5/23/2017 7:33 PM

JASTA STRAW MAN?

389

through non-military means.235 A key aspect of soft power is a state’s
reputation and compliance with rule of law and international norms.236 In
other words, soft power is enhanced by adhering to international law.237
Given the transnational nature of terrorism, the United States cannot
expect to prevent terrorist attacks without the collaboration of other
states.238 Policies such as JASTA that undermine customary law and
custom do not go unnoticed, nor do they encourage collaboration.239 As
writer and foreign affairs journalist Fareed Zakaria discussed shortly before
the United States began the Iraq War: “America is virtually alone. Never
will it have waged a war in such isolation. Never have so many of its allies
been so firmly opposed to its policies False In fact, the debate is not about
Saddam anymore. It is about America and its role in the new world . . . .”240
JASTA is policy that isolates the United States in the eyes of the world and
promotes a return of military might versus military right.241 This kind of
legislation is untenable for combating terrorism and should be repealed.
V. CONCLUSION
JASTA will not achieve its stated aim of holding foreign states
accountable for materially supporting terrorism because it creates potent
and unjustifiable risks.242 First, it allows private litigants to bring sovereign
states into U.S. courts against the long-established principles of sovereign

235. See id. at 18-21 (advocating soft power diplomacy as an alternative to military
force to influence foreign states).
236. See Borgen, supra note 222, at 775 (arguing soft power creates pull that
attracts other states to collaborate and eases cooperation).
237. See id. (citing Harold Honju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1479, 1480 (2003) which argues that when the US obeys international norms it
enhances its moral authority).
238. See generally Crocker Snow, Jr., The Privatization of U.S. Public Diplomacy,
32 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 189, 192 (2008) (noting the “with us or against us”
policies for combatting terrorism were not successful).
239. See Al-Dhari, supra note 233 (suggesting that Congress was not aware how
JASTA would affect its credibility).
240. See Borgen supra note 222, at 776 (quoting Fareed Zakaria, The Arrogant
Empire, NEWSWEEK, at 18, 20-23 (Mar. 24, 2003)).
241. See Snow, supra note 238, at 192 (arguing that taking unilateralist positions on
key matters of war and peace are widely viewed as hypocritical to U.S. ideals).
242. See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 67 (noting JASTA only deals with
amenability to suit rather than immunities for attachment of assets that could satisfy a
successful judgment); see also Vladeck, JASTA, supra note 77 (positing that JASTA is
the worst of all worlds by presenting victims of terrorism with legislation that is legally
weak, while eroding the principle of sovereign immunity and relations with Saudi
Arabia).
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immunity.243 This allows private citizens to circumvent the political
branches if they believe they were harmed by a foreign state, stripping the
executive of its power to effectively govern foreign relations and protect
American interests.244 Secondly, JASTA opens the door for reciprocal
litigation against the United States, endangering American citizens and
property held abroad.245
In addition, JASTA’s drafting denudes much of what it purports to do.246
It fails to overturn prior judicial decisions relating to 9/11 litigation,
providing no new remedy for these victims as it claims.247 Further, it
provides for an executive stay of action that can stall litigation.248 Finally,
it fails to address the attachment of assets to successful judgments, the
greatest hurdle for litigants seeking reparations from a foreign state.249
Rather than help victims of terrorism as it purports, JASTA erodes
protections for citizens as a whole, and interferes with the executive’s
policies of combating terrorism by violating international law and
damaging relations between states.

243. See generally Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 146 (1812)
(establishing the principle of sovereign immunity in U.S. jurisprudence).
244. See id. (concluding that the has the authority to thwart domestic litigation
when the needs of foreign policy are pressing).
245. See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 64 (testifying that only the
international practice of recognizing sovereign immunity protects the United States
from financial risk through suit and distracting harassment); Veto Message, supra note
25 (remarking enactment of JASTA encourages foreign governments to allow their
domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. officials and military for allegedly
causing injuries overseas).
246. See Vladeck, JASTA, supra note 77 (comparing JASTA as it was proposed and
its force as enacted).
247. See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2 (claiming but not providing for plaintiffs
to seek relief against persons, entities, and foreign states “wherever they may be
found”).
248. See id. at § 5 (opening the door for the executive to use its claims settlement
power or stay litigation indefinitely).
249. See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 68 (concluding that civil actions
against foreign states frustrate victims because they are rarely paid while
simultaneously causing conflict with foreign states).
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